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The success of processes of democratic change is often predicated on the
moderation of anti-systemic and extremist parties. The literature on such
parties argues that such moderation, namely the acceptance of democratic
procedures, human rights, and a market economy, comes about through
inclusion. This seems to be borne out when one analyses a number of
Islamist parties having contributed to the progressive democratization of
their respective countries. The Tunisian case, however, offers a different
perspective on moderation. This article argues that it has been exclusion
through repression and social marginalization that has led the Islamist party
Ennahda to move from its extreme anti-systemic position of the 1970s to
become the mainstream conservative party it is today.
Keywords: moderation; repression; exclusion; Ennahda; Tunisia;
democratization
Introduction
On 23 October 2011, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda (Renaissance Party)
completed a most remarkable comeback on the country’s political scene. After
having been banned and heavily repressed for three decades with its leaders and
cadres either in exile, in prison, or marginalized in society, the party was legalized
on 1March 2011 following the fall of the dictatorship and proceeded to win the ﬁrst
and free elections the country ever held with an impressive score, taking 89 seats
out of 217 in the Constituent Assembly.1 The victory, or at least the size of it, was a
surprise for many Tunisians and for the international community. After the elec-
tions Ennahda went on to form a three-party coalition government with two
centre-left parties whose ideological references are far removed from its own, high-
lighting what Ozzano, in his contribution to the special issue, considers an impor-
tant trait of conservative parties.2 Both the party’s electoral victory and its decision
to form cross-ideological alliances should not be interpreted as surprises. A closer
analysis reveals in fact that Ennahda has gone through a profound ideological
transformation over its forty-year history that no longer makes it anti-democratic;
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quite the opposite.3 These moderate stances might not be genuine or fully interna-
lized and are certainly not accepted in many left-wing and secular circles: in par-
ticular after the assassination of the left-wing leader Chokri Belaid in February
2013, when Ennahda was accused of betraying the revolution and working for
the construction of an authoritarian theocracy.4 However, what Ennahda has
done over the last few years strongly indicates change. In any case, and despite
what a number of Tunisian commentators argue when pointing at “its double-
speak”,5 Ennahda can be said to have become what Luca Ozzano categorizes in
his framing contribution to this special issue as a conservative party.6
In his contribution, Ozzano also claims the categories of religiously oriented
parties that he proposes are far from being watertight: parties therefore can move
back and forth through these different categories. Accounting for the possibility
of change and explaining how this comes about is an important part of the story
of many such parties in the Arab world, where the liberalizing trends following
the Arab Spring are affording them the opportunity to win power through the
ballot box.7 Focusing on the case of the Islamist Ennahda, this article examines
the mechanisms that explain how a religiously oriented party “travels” from one
category to another and the inﬂuence this has on the democratization of Tunisia.
Speciﬁcally, it analyses the very dramatic change that Ennahda made from funda-
mentalist to conservative party during its existence. From being an anti-democratic
and illiberal movement with a tawhid-based (principle of unity) vision of politics
and society determined to impose religious law over democratic electoral decisions
in the 1970s, it has travelled towards the acceptance of the procedural mechanisms
of democracy in the context of a pluralistic vision of society by the late 1980s. The
literature on Islamist parties and extremist parties more broadly deﬁnes this shift as
moderation, whereby the term is synonymous with acceptance of the triptych of
democracy – mechanisms to select governing elites, fundamental liberal rights,
and market economy. The principal variable to explain this shift can be resumed
in “moderation through inclusion”, whereby the progressive inclusion of radical
and anti-systemic parties into the political system forces them to “compromise”
with their original extreme views in order to be able to compete in a pluralistic
environment where shared rules have to be designed and where the constraints
of participation inevitably force a review of strict ideological positions to attain
at least some of the political goals the party has.8 In authoritarian settings this is
accompanied by the realization that cross-ideological alliances with other opposi-
tion parties are also necessary to defeat incumbents.
What is interesting in the case of Ennahda, contrary for instance to the full or
partial inclusion of Islamist parties elsewhere,9 is that inclusion into the political
system never really occurred and acceptance of the party from large sectors of
Tunisian society materialized very slowly. Thus, moderation through inclusion
does not really explain the very signiﬁcant change in Ennahda’s ideological and
political positions and this speaks to the take on moderation that Christophe Jaffre-
lot has in his article in this special issue.10 It follows that a different explanation is
required and the article explores what can be labelled “moderation through
858 F. Cavatorta and F. Merone
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exclusion”. For the majority of the literature exclusion is synonymous with the
repressive violence that the state perpetrates against opposition political move-
ments and strictness of rules imposed on those wishing to be involved in the pol-
itical system.11 The Tunisian case certainly reﬂects this type of exclusion against
Ennahda – and its previous incarnations as Jamaa andMouvement Tendence Isla-
mique (MTI). In the early 1990s the state heavily repressed Islamism in the name of
safeguarding the country from an obscurantiste ideology and then from 2001
onwards repression was conducted in the name of ﬁghting terrorism. However
exclusion can be also deﬁned more broadly to include the social rejection of pol-
itical projects that are perceived to be alien to mainstream society, which can
reinforce and to a certain extent underpin and legitimize state’s repression. The
hypothesis here is that the harsh repression against the party at the hands of the
state, the imprisonment or exile of its leaders and cadres together with the strong
rejection the party faced in large sectors of Tunisian society for quite some time
made it possible and necessary for Ennahda to entirely re-elaborate how political
Islam could contribute to the developmental trajectory of the country. From this re-
elaboration ﬂows the acceptance of the dominant discourse of democracy, liberal-
ism, and market economy without which the party would not have been able to ﬁnd
much space in Tunisia. Ultimately it is about maintaining religious values simply
as references and not as guiding principles of public policy-making, as Olivier Roy
also recently pointed out.12 Building on this thesis of “moderation through exclu-
sion”, the article offers an analysis of the intellectual-ideological introspection that
Ennahda went through to be able to ﬁnd acceptance in the institutional game and,
crucially, in wider society. This analysis is based on the examination of the scho-
larly literature on the party and interviews with many of its leaders.
While it is always difﬁcult to derive generalizations from a single case, the
journey of Ennahda can point to signiﬁcant trends within political Islam and its
party expressions at a time when processes of democratization are taking place
in the Arab world, albeit amidst considerable difﬁculties. The linkage between
the religiosity of political actors and democratization is usually problematic
because such actors are often perceived to be inimical to many fundamental
liberal rights and because of their ideological rigidity. The case of Ennahda pro-
vides evidence that this might not necessarily always be the case and that democra-
tization can beneﬁt from the positive input of religiously oriented parties.
Ennahda . . . in moderation
In post-revolutionary Tunisia, Ennahda plays a central role in the process of demo-
cratization having committed its considerable resources to the construction of a
new plural democratic political system that would respect civil liberties and
human rights.13 This political positioning of Ennahda has come under criticism
from some sectors of secular civil and political societies such as women’s rights
organizations, parties of the extreme left and the new political formation of
Bourguibist inspiration Nida Tounes that perceive in the embracing of democracy
Democratization 859
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on the part of Ennahda some sort of ruse to obtain uncontested power and then
proceed to implement the construction of an exclusionary religion-based state.14
In many ways contemporary criticism of and accusations against Ennahda
resemble the traditional ones that secular Arabs, or seculars tout court as the intro-
duction to the special issue makes clear, held against Islamist parties since their
inception, although in the Tunisian case this criticism is no longer as widespread
as it was in the past, as the alliance between Islamists and secular and socialist
ﬁgures such as Moncef Marzouki and Mustapha Ben Jaafer indicates. In any
case, this normative view opens an endless and rather trite debate about the
genuine commitment of Islamist parties when it comes to the procedures of democ-
racy and human rights.15 This article does not intend to second-guess Ennahda and
its actions, preferring instead to focus on its political praxis. Much like in Alaya
Allani’s work on Ennahda, there is the acceptance that the party has come a
long way since its foundation in terms of its attitude towards the fundamental prin-
ciples of electoral democracy and basic human rights.16
When one attempts to trace the political positions of the party over time with
respect to the institutional system, economic choices, and social set-up, what
emerges suggests a profound shift towards moderation. When looking at
Ennahda, its political trajectory is inevitably intertwined with Ghannouchi’s intel-
lectual history and the way in which his understanding of the role of Islamism in
politics evolved.17 Thus, there is no doubt that the party is very much inﬂuenced
by the development of Ghannouchi’s political thinking. However, it would be erro-
neous to conﬂate the trajectory of the party entirely with Ghannounchi because
other leaders such Abdelfattah Mourou or Mohammed Khouja have also been
important activists and thinkers. The outcome of the development of Ghannouchi’s
thinking, together with the internal debate between different factions within the
party – such as the moderate wing of Mourou or the more radical one linked to
Salaﬁsm that Khouja (the current leader of the Salaﬁst party Front of Reform)
embodied – has been one of increasing moderation. There are a number of
aspects that seem to conﬁrm such moderation.
First, on the issue of the nature of the Tunisian state, there has been a sea-
change in the Islamist movement’s position since the 1970s. Under the inﬂuence
of the more militant ideology of theMuslim Brothers of the late 1960s and through-
out the 1970s, the movement Rachid Ghannouchi18 led subscribed to the creation
of an Islamic state whereby the application of sharia law for the whole society
reﬂected the unitary vision embodied in the principle of tawhid. In this vision,
there is a perfect and unquestioned overlap between the state and religion. This
principle of unity inﬂuenced a Manichean view of society and politics whereby
“belief” should replace “unbelief”: this simple shift would eventually heal all the
social and political conﬂicts in society.
By the early 1980s Ghannouchi had begun to think about the nature of the state
in a different manner and the party progressively abandoned this vision. This did
not occur seamlessly, as the party went through a signiﬁcant split in the late
1980s, when a radical fringe left Ennahda to remain on a more uncompromising
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position related to the necessity of building an Islamic state. The party has arrived
at a point where it currently supports the creation of a “civil” state (dawla mada-
niyya), openly subscribing to the idea that references to religion are purely iden-
tity-based and not sources for public policy-making.19 Thus, in the debate over
the drafting of the post-revolutionary Tunisian constitution, the party has been
able to compromise with the secular sectors of society on a provision that reﬂects
this principle. This has a practical impact on the strategy of alliances that Ennahda
undertakes with some secular parties, refusing implicitly to be the sole representa-
tive of the people by virtue of its religious references.20 In addition, party leaders
emphasize that subscription to democratic procedures and values characterizes the
party internally as well. Ali Larayedh, member of the Executive Committee of the
party and now Prime Minister, stated that democratic decision-making informs the
party at all levels.21 This issue of internal democracy is obviously disputed and
might not correspond to the reality, but what is interesting to note is that prominent
Ennahda leaders feel they have to employ pro-democracy rhetoric to appear as
legitimate interlocutors. This profoundly contrasts with Tunisian Salaﬁsts for
instance, who instead have no qualms about condemning liberal-democracy.22
Second, on the issues of fundamental human rights and equality we also
witness a profound shift from the early 1970s onwards. This is the continuation
of the re-elaboration of the principle of tawhid in so far as imposition of mores
of behaviour is justiﬁed within the framework of that principle, but once this is
transformed into support for a civil state, a different understanding of human
rights ﬂows. This is most notable on women’s rights and, speciﬁcally in the case
of Tunisia, on the egalitarian Personal Status Code introduced by Bourguiba in
1956. Despite the virulent opposition that Ennahda still engenders in secular fem-
inist movements such as Femmes Democrates because of its conservative positions
on gender relations, the party claims that it fully accepted the liberal Personal
Status Code in the 1980s. As mentioned, this does not mean that the party has aban-
doned its socially conservative views about the role of women in society and about
gender relations more generally, which should be centred on the absolute primary
role of the family in society. Of course, such acceptance might have been purely
instrumental and tactical in order to beneﬁt from the inclusion into the very brief
liberalizing period of late 1980s, but the point is that Ennahda did not go back
on it when repression hit the movement and when a more radical attitude could
have been expected given that there were no beneﬁts to be gained by this position
of tactical moderation.
Third, and in line with other Islamist movements, Ennahda started off with
little interest for economic matters to develop a critical attitude towards capital-
ism, particularly in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution through the inﬂuence
of Ali Shariati, as recognized by Ghannouchi himself.23 Ill at ease with socialism
as well, the party searched for a third way between the market economy of the
imperialist West and the command economy of socialist countries. However, it
can be argued that the critique of capitalism dominated the economic agenda of
the party during the 1970s and 1980s. Thanks to the intellectual input of the
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Iranian revolution in 1979, the leadership was able to make the connection
between the promotion of the material interests of the disenfranchized and reli-
gious principles, proposing the establishment of an economic model that would
eliminate the shortcomings – read profound inequalities – of the capitalist
system. While the party maintains in some ways that this third way is still poten-
tially pursuable,24 it is quite evident that it has moved signiﬁcantly towards the
acceptance of a market economy integrated into the global neoliberal system as
the only way for Tunisia to develop. There has been for instance no real debate
about the free trade agreement that links Tunisia so closely to the European econ-
omies and even though the party seeks to attract more Gulf investment into the
country, the neoliberal logic is the same given that the Gulf economies are
fully part of the process of neoliberal globalization. It is revelatory that today
the constituency of reference of Ennahda is largely composed of merchants,
traders, and business people rather than the fully disenfranchized (mouham-
mishin) who ﬁnd instead representation in the extra-institutional Salaﬁst move-
ments or in marginal leftist groups.25
Finally, the anti-imperialist dimension of Islamism has been over time con-
siderably diluted. Although there is nominal support for the Palestinians as there
was indignation for the 1991 and 2003 invasions of Iraq and therefore a degree
of anti-Americanism, these attitudes are widely shared among Tunisian political
parties of all ideological persuasions. Currently, the party displays a signiﬁcant
degree of pragmatism on foreign policy matters and has for instance acceded to
American demands for a crackdown of Salaﬁst activism in the aftermath of the
attack on the US embassy in Tunis in September 2012. Ghannouchi and other
leaders have been very reassuring with the United States and the European
Union about their intentions on foreign policy matters when it comes to US and
European interests in the region. There is a sense that the policies Tunisia
pursued in this respect under Ben Ali will not be much altered.26
As one can therefore note, the journey towards moderation the party has tra-
velled since the 1970s until its arrival in power in 2011 has been quite a long
one. It is a journey towards moderation in so far as it accepts the dominant
values and discourses that the majority of the international community subscribes
to. Thus, following the two dimensions that Ozzano offers to categorize religiously
oriented parties, Ennahda, certainly under the impulse of its leader, changed both
ideologically and practically. The question though remains as to what made the
party undertake this journey.
The inclusion-moderation hypothesis
Islamist parties have been central to academic and policy debates of Arab politics
since their forceful emergence in the 1970s. More speciﬁcally their presence has
affected debates about democratization and authoritarian resilience in the region.
More often than not the religious orientation of such parties was held to be an insur-
mountable obstacle to the demise of authoritarian rule, preventing processes of
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tentative democratization from succeeding.27 In the 2000s, the debate on Islamist
parties changed because it became noticeable that, increasingly, a number of such
movements had begun to adopt and subscribe to the language of democracy and
human rights, taking part in participatory politics whenever the opportunity
arose.28 Over time and despite the scepticism surrounding them both domestically
and internationally, a number of them progressively shifted their most radical pos-
itions in order to be able to construct cross-ideological agreements with non-
Islamist opposition forces with a view to becoming an alternative bloc to the
ruling coalition.29 Crucially, they also tended to accept invitations to participate
in regime-sponsored initiatives of limited political openings despite the realization
that such openings would not lead to policy-making power. The literature examin-
ing these shifts follows largely the incipit of Olivier Roy’s 1992 work in which he
pointed to the failure of political Islam as an ideological project alternative to the
dominant values of liberal-democracy, suggesting implicitly that Islamism would
have to ﬁnd and elaborate new categories of thinking and action if it wished to
remain a relevant political actor.30
Given that the dominant international discourse of political legitimization since
the end of the 1980s across the globe rested on the three pillars of representative
democracy, liberal human rights, and market economy, many Islamist parties
began to utilize such categories, although through an indigenous re-elaboration
based on the scriptures and interpretations of Islam. While this was occurring, a
narrative developed through which mainstream Islamist parties began to be exam-
ined according to the notion of progressive moderation31 with a focus on the differ-
ent ways in which such moderation was understood.32 This followed the ﬁndings
of the inclusion-moderation theory as applied in Europe to extreme left-wing
parties and religious parties in the aftermath of World War II. Post-World War II
societies in Western Europe were more inclusive than the authoritarian regimes
in which Islamist parties operated, but Arab regimes have been experimenting
with liberalization for quite some time and therefore the literature has attempted
to use the hypothesis of moderation through inclusion in such contexts as well.
The principal idea of this line of inquiry is derived from the assumption that
increased political participation in consensual institutions, whether with the
regime or with other opposition parties, leads to the moderation of the Islamist pos-
ition regarding the nature of the state and the extent of liberal rights. Thus, through
continued interaction with other political actors, Islamists learn to moderate and
they are socialized into the mechanisms of compromise and bargaining, the very
foundation of the liberal-democratic game.33 Within this larger literature, two
types of studies can be distinguished. On the one hand, we have analyses explain-
ing the “progressive moderation” of speciﬁc Islamist parties such as the Turkish
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) or the Moroccan Party for Justice and Develop-
ment (PJD). They have come to embody the very notion of political moderation
and acceptance of democracy and human rights together with a market-oriented
stance on economic matters and a pragmatic one on sensitive strategic issues of
importance for the West.34 On the other hand, there are studies that highlight the
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similarities of the Islamist journey towards moderation with the one that other
extremist radical anti-systemic parties travelled in the past, such as the communist
parties of Western Europe.35
The moderation through inclusion thesis has a number of advantages. First, it
contributes to providing the theoretical tools necessary to explain the choice of
moderation that many Islamist parties did indeed make given that inclusion and
cross-ideological alliances have been a trait of Arab politics in a number of
countries over recent years. There are a number of cases where progressive
inclusion, no matter how stop-start and limited in nature, did indeed allow Islamist
parties to come to accept ideological compromises and endorse pragmatism in
order to participate, at times marginally and at others more substantively, in politi-
cal life. Second, it has the merit of challenging, from a policy-making perspective,
the validity of the choice of relentless repression of political expressions based on
religious prescriptions. Finally, it has the beneﬁt of “normalizing” Islamist parties
and their attitudes on a range of issues because it provides a parallel with other con-
texts and ideologies that demonstrate how the Arab world might not be so “excep-
tional” in terms of its apparently culture-speciﬁc rejection of democracy and
human rights.
However, the “moderation through inclusion” thesis has a signiﬁcant short-
coming, which undermines in part its applicability and validity across all cases.
Crucially, there is very little thinking about the possibility that exclusion might
have led anti-systemic parties to revise their ideological tenets and political strat-
egies towards moderation in cases where there was no inclusion to speak of.
There is a rather widespread assumption that repression of anti-systemic views pro-
vokes further radicalization and ultimately anti-systemic violence as a reaction.
A number of studies highlight how it is the violent repression of the state that is
responsible for radicalization, which, in turn, prevents not only moderation but
also democratic political change.36 However there is, at least in theory, the possi-
bility that the vast majority of those who are repressed and rejected in large sectors
of society might end up critically revisiting their activism. Thus, rather than opting
for radicalization, they might instead choose to re-formulate the ideological tenets
and strategies that brought about repression and social rejection to moderate their
stances and demands. While this might certainly not hold true for the whole of the
movement or party being targeted for repression – with the outcome of creating
splits – it might be true for a sufﬁcient number of leaders and cadres to see that
their radicalism has failed to make headway, leading them to think about ideologi-
cal and concrete changes. It is this aspect of moderation through exclusion that the
following section explores, with a focus on the Tunisian case. It is always proble-
matic to generalize from one case study, but the conditions that led to the moder-
ation in the Tunisian case can potentially be present in other Arab societies.
The case of Ennahda is interesting precisely because the dominant narrative of
moderation through inclusion does not apply given the almost relentless state
repression and widespread social rejection it faced over the last four decades.
Despite exclusion, the party has certainly moderated more than sufﬁciently for
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key actors on both the Tunisian and international stages to deserve to be treated as
possibly the most moderate and pragmatic Islamist party in the Arab world.37
Ennahda’s long march
As mentioned earlier, a number of cases such as the Turkish AKP or the Moroccan
PJD or the Yemeni Islah conﬁrm the validity of the moderation by inclusion thesis
whereby there is a strict correlation between the progressive institutionalization of
Islamist parties and their acceptance of democratic constraints. The Tunisian case
offers a rather different perspective on the mechanisms of moderation. Having
established that the Islamist movement in Tunisia came a long way, inclusion
and progressive institutionalization in the political system cannot be said to have
been the principal explanatory variables; quite the opposite is true. In fact the
Tunisian speciﬁcity is that the Islamist movement faced a double exclusion:
from the state and from large sectors of Tunisian society. It is at this juncture
where the novelty of this analysis resides in so far as we tease out the meaning
of exclusion to make it a more ﬂuid concept than simply state-led repression. On
the one hand was the traditional type of exclusion linked to state repression and
speciﬁcally the outright refusal to integrate any religious movement into the politi-
cal system. This type of exclusion was quite relentless throughout the dictatorships
of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, although there were a couple of very small open-
ings during the 1980s.38 This exclusion brought down signiﬁcant violence on the
Islamist movement with its leaders and ordinary members periodically arrested,
imprisoned for long periods, or exiled. On the other hand there is the exclusion
of the Islamists coming from society, particularly in the 1970s, 1980s and, although
less intense, into the 1990s. Tunisian understanding and practice of Islam was cer-
tainly a value of reference for many ordinary citizens, but they perceived it quite
apolitically. It follows that the politicization of religion that Islamists brought to
the fore was largely alien to their political and social vision and struggles.
Rachid Ghannouchi also recognizes this when he talks about the place that Isla-
mism had in Tunisia in the 1970s: “Islamist militants felt a sense of alienation
from wider society”39 because they sensed rejection and not only because they
were dissatisﬁed with the place of religion in Tunisia.
The analysis of the evolution of the Tunisian Islamist movement from funda-
mentalist to conservative has to take into account both types of exclusion as expla-
natory mechanisms for the re-elaboration of the theoretical and ideological
underpinnings of the Islamist project in the country, away from the rigidity of an
Islamic state imposed from the top to the acceptance of a plural civil state. What
we have is a dialectic mechanism whereby the movement initially – and the struc-
tured party later – has to change from within because of the conditioning from
without. In some ways the mechanisms of exclusion catalyzed some of the internal
ideological debates that were naturally occurring in a heterogeneous movement.
Particularly, the focus should be on the impact of the mainstream ideological
and cultural vision of society, referring to the understanding and acceptance of
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categories of modernity embedded in the Tunisian national consciousness. These
are embodied in a tradition of tolerance and religious reformism of the scholars
of the Zitouna. In short, according to Sami Brahim, a leading Islamic intellectual,40
Tunisia is characterized by the predominance of what he calls “an implicit social
consensus”, whereby extremisms, including religious ones, are largely rejected
in society. This means that forms of social organization that do not fall within
this consensus remain marginal and minoritarian. Brahim gives the example of
polygamy, a practice perceived to be illiberal and anti-women, to illustrate this
point in the sense that Tunisian society has integrated, across its social milieux,
the refusal of such practice, although this is permitted in the literalist understanding
of the scriptures. This refusal generates a political consensus that includes the vast
majority of Islamism. The main argument is really about Tunisian society as a
natural limit to extremism, which is a point that comes across in discussions
with younger members of Ennahda as well. For instance, they do not genuinely
understand radical Salaﬁst literalist positions and perceive them as alien.41
If one traces the history of the movement back to its early jamaa stage and its
later incarnation as a political party, it is possible to detect change towards moder-
ation not as the product of inclusion but of conﬂict with a society that used to reject
Islamism and embraced it only when it became fully “Tunisian”. The ﬁrst real
encounter with wider Tunisian society and its attitudes took place on university
campuses in the 1970s. Until then the jamaa was concerned with the organization
of discussion “circles” (halaqat) in mosques and schools where a type of Islamism
anchored in the readings and experiences of the Qutb-inspired Egyptian Brother-
hood dominated. Within this context, there were in the jamaa simplistic beliefs
and assumptions of how Islam could be politically activated in society, according
to Ghannouchi.42 The categories through which they operated had to do with the
conﬂict between “belief” and “un-belief” that they perceived in Tunisian society.
Once Islamist students began to be active on university campuses, they realized
quite quickly that the left dominated the political scene and that, more broadly,
social mores were heavily secularized. Islamism was therefore seen as somewhat
alien among the activist youth and in both working-class and bourgeois circles,
not because the religious practices were alien to ordinary Tunisians, but because
the problems and issues that society faced as a whole could not be solved and
even conceived of in the simplistic categories of belief and unbelief. In addition,
all this was occurring at a time when the Bourguibist secular political project
was the state’s ideology, which the Islamists were also up against. Among Islamist
students, there was the sudden realization that they had very little or nothing to con-
tribute to the national debate about the direction Tunisia should take economically,
socially, and politically, because for a long time the categories used for such debate
were framed through secular ideologies. This came as a shock to many of them and
in this phase it is important to underline that their lack of success and sense of alien-
ation were not the product of repressive exclusion, because state authorities were
actually quite tolerant of their activism on campuses; it came about because of
societal exclusion. The socialist and Marxist left occupied almost entirely the
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public space in universities – and was able to mobilize the youth because it seemed
to be the only political project alternative to Bourguiba’s. It was, however, just as
secular as Bourguibism. Islamist students on campuses had intense debates with
leftist students, which the left won hands down in so far as it became the protago-
nist of the 1978 general strike on the part of the trade union Union Ge´ne´rale Tra-
vailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) against Bourguiba.43 This was a turning point for the
Islamists because they were faced with the irrelevance of their categories among
those who opposed the regime in place. While they still thought in terms of
belief and unbelief, society was either on a leftist revolutionary path or behind
the secular Bourguiba. Thus, Islamists had to decide whether they wanted to go
back to their discussion circles and become marginalized or change direction to
be appealing to the politicized masses entering the scene against the regime.44 In
short, the limits of social representation of the Jamaa at this stage lay with the
inability to offer a political programme that addressed the social issues at the
core of the 1978 strike and the bread riots of 1984, although the movement did
grow somewhat during this period of social tensions. What is interesting to note
is that large sectors of the trade union UGTT still today have a very difﬁcult
time reconciling with Ennahda, although their ranks also include many Ennahda
members and sympathizers.45
Taking different paths
From the crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the movement evolved in three
different directions. First, a group of liberal Islamists such as Ennafeir and el Jorchi
began working for a cultural reform within Islam and subscribed to the idea of
referring to a speciﬁc Tunisian Islam based on the traditional reformism of the
Zitouna, which would be by its very nature closer to Tunisian society. Second, a
group of radicals such as Mohammed Ali Hurath and Mohammed Khouja left
and began to pursue either a dawa-inspired activism in society or armed violence.
Finally, the larger group, which is usually identiﬁed with Rachid Ghannouchi and
Abdelfattah Mourou, went on to form a political party in order to measure the
appeal of a renewed Islamist project in a competitive political environment. It is
thus that the MTI came about on 6 June 1981. What is interesting in this respect
is the mechanism that drove the creation of the party and this has to do with the
explicit admission that the previous theoretical categories borrowed from the
experiences of the rest of the Arab world did not apply to Tunisian society,
which had gone through a radically different process of socio-economic, historical,
and intellectual development. Ghannouchi and Mourou recognized that one size
did not ﬁt all. As also recognized from within Ennahda today, the acceptance of
the challenge of institutional politics as a mechanism to respond to the demands
of the masses through categories they could easily recognize was the product of
a theoretical re-elaboration that brought into Tunisian Islamism some of the con-
cepts of the Iranian revolution. Unlike what critics of the party usually point to,
the most important import from Iran is not the idea of the theocratic state, but
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the conﬂict between mustadaafeen (the disenfranchized) and mustaqhbareen (the
arrogant). It is not so much the work of Khomeini that makes a difference for Ghan-
nouchi and the leadership, but the analysis of Ali Shariati on class.46 They discover
that the notions of disenfranchized and privileged can have a religious connotation
and this is sufﬁcient to include them in a new theoretical repositioning of the party
that corresponds better to the demands of anti-Bourguiba Tunisian society for class
representation in politics, particularly at a time when the left was slightly beginning
to wane through the massive repression of the state and the broader loss of appeal
of socialism. In the words of Ghannouchi, “the movement took a step towards
society and society took a step towards the movement” because the religious con-
notations of the two categories ofmustadaafeen andmustaqhbareen are reassuring
for those conservative sectors of society that need political ideals to be embedded
into religion. In addition to this, the Islamists were examining with interest the
“success” of the Mestiri-led Mouvement Democratique Socialiste (MDS) as the
largest opposition party in the country because it forced them to be confronted
with the “liberal” idea of democratic mechanisms in so far as the MDS criticized
one-party rule in the name of the inherent pluralism in Tunisian society.47 All
these re-elaborations are obviously not only the direct outcome of external con-
ditions because exclusion from society is not occurring in a vacuum: in the move-
ment itself there was already a debate taking place about the nature of its political
and social engagement through the categories of Islam. In some ways rejection
serves the purpose of catalyzing debate and is at the root of the splits highlighted
earlier.
This phase of exclusion continued in the early 1980s and this time it was a
much more traditional form of exclusion through state repression and violence
that targeted not only the radical and a small armed faction that had broken with
the MTI, but also the MTI itself. Thus, the gains in society that the movement
had made through the incorporation of new theoretical categories and the decision
to form a political party seeking institutionalization were offset by repression.
Superﬁcially, it may appear that the repressive campaign and the imprisonment
of the leadership pushed the party towards greater moderation. It is for instance
in jail in the early 1980s that Rachid Ghannouchi produced the theoretical work
that is now the pillar of the attitudes and policy positions of the party with
respect to public freedoms in the direction of cementing democracy as the only
viable political system. The repressive campaign in and of itself did not,
however, directly inﬂuence the theoretical reﬂection and production of Ghannou-
chi. Such reﬂection for instance was not shared by all Tunisian Islamists, indicating
that other Islamists equally repressed still subscribed to a different ideological fra-
mework. Nevertheless, Ghannouchi’s intellectual work still constituted a signiﬁ-
cant development because it would inform and constrain the actions of militants
from this point onwards, as such reﬂection would be increasingly discussed and
eventually accepted from within. It should also be highlighted that according to
Ghannouchi himself repression was a problematic interruption in what was a
natural progression towards the acceptance of democratic procedures and basic
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human rights.48 In short, it is not jail that makes Islamists more moderate, but the
realization that, with or without imprisonment, they had to confront a society that
was still not at ease with the Manichean views that Islamists had in the 1970s and
early 1980s. As Ghannouchi argues when talking to his own constituency to con-
vince them of the necessity of a transformation within the frame of religion: “reli-
gion prospers within democracy; it is within dictatorship that it fades. Look at what
happens to Muslims: they escape dictatorships in the Muslim world to look for
freedom in established democracies. As Mawdudi and Qutb said, Islam is in its
essence a revolution of liberation for mankind from slavery and constraints
(within the limits God Imposed) . . . It is both spiritual and social freedom”.49
After a brief democratic opening in the late 1980s under the premiership of
Mzali, who seemed to accept the commitment of the MTI to pluralism, a new
repressive campaign began under then Minister of Interior Ben Ali.50 Once the
latter became president in 1987 he launched a political pact that would introduce
political pluralism in Tunisia and the MTI changed its name in order to take part
in the construction of what they believed was going to be a new Tunisia and gen-
uinely demonstrate its commitment to the civil nature of the state given that they
dropped a clear reference to religion when the party became Ennahda.51
Ennahda was not ofﬁcially recognized as a political party, but its candidates
were allowed to run as independents. However a number of factors, both dom-
estic – the better than expected results of Ennahda – and international – the
civil war in Algeria – prevented the consolidation of the Tunisian process of lib-
eralization and a new repressive campaign against Islamists began in earnest in
order to avoid an Algerian scenario of violence.
Once again, this rupture is decisive for the journey of the party towards mod-
eration because it will engender an internal debate about the necessity of building
bridges with ideological rivals in opposition that were shunning Ennahda. Once
again it is exclusion broadly conceived that is the explanatory mechanism. In
addition to the repressive policies aimed at the annihilation of the movement, it
should be underlined that the secular sector of society, represented by secular
political parties and civil society groups, compounded the harsh exclusionary pol-
icies of the state against the Islamists. Secular parties and social movements were
far from convinced of Ennahda’s self-representation as moderate and democratic.
There are solid reasons for this new social impetus against Ennahda that concerned
this sector of society. First, it should be admitted that the progressive, moderate,
and democratic theoretical elaborations of the leadership had a difﬁcult time ﬁlter-
ing down to an Islamist popular base that was incensed by repression and radica-
lized by international events such as the Algerian civil war or the attack against
Iraq. It is clear that the process of internal change of the party towards the accep-
tance of democracy, women’s rights, and pluralism that found its most signiﬁcant
expression in the signature of the national pact of 1988 had a difﬁcult time impos-
ing itself on the Islamist popular base. Second, the internal split within the party,
symbolized in the isolation of the moderate and rather liberal co-founder
Mourou, seemed to suggest that a more radical anti-systemic attitude was
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winning out internally, with an ambiguous attitude towards political violence emer-
ging. Finally, the popular gains that the Islamist movement had made throughout
the 1980s after their ﬁrst rupture with their jamaa past had forced Tunisian
secular parties to come to terms with the popularity of doing politics through reli-
gion. This turned them against any expression of political religiosity, whether mod-
erate or radical, because this would fundamentally alter the secular nature of the
state.
With this in mind, many secular Tunisians remained silent if not supportive of
the exclusion of Ennahda throughout more than a decade. The tacit consensus for
repression on the part of secular society is more signiﬁcant for the second phase of
theoretical re-elaboration of the party after 1991 than imprisonment or exile. For
quite some time this secular ﬁght on two fronts – against the regime and against
Islamists – was a trait of most Arab societies52 but it often ended with an uneasy
support for authoritarian incumbents.53 In any case, the isolation of the 1990s
pushed the party even more in the direction of what were quickly becoming the
only internationally legitimate pillars to operate on the political scene: democracy,
human rights, and the market. It was only the common destiny of repression54 that
developed during the later years of the Ben Ali era between all genuine opposition
players that permitted the creation of a united front against the regime that includes
Ennahda. It was ﬁgures such as human rights activist and leader of the secular party
Congress for the Republic Marzouki who moved ﬁrst, suggesting that democracy
in Tunisia would come only through an agreement with Ennahda and not against it.
The progressive exclusionary repressive policies against all forms of dissent and
the absence of public freedoms during the Ben Ali era pushed the party to accept
at all levels the necessity of democracy and allow it to strategically form alliances
with equally repressed secular political forces in the name of change. Crucial in all
of this was the “ﬁnal submission” to the idea that social pluralism needs to be
accommodated. As Riadh Chaibi, member of the Ennahda national assembly,
argued in 2011: “we are not a dogmatic party, we are a pragmatic party. We
realise that Tunisia is a plural country and Europe is very close to us not only geo-
graphically. Tunisian society is similar in many ways to European societies and this
is a given andwe do not want to change that”.55 The necessity for democracy ﬁnally
found its highest coordination point in the 18 October 2005 Collectif, which can be
considered the moment when Ennahda no longer faced widespread rejection from
the political and social representatives of many sectors of Tunisian society; moder-
ation is recognized as having been attained.
Conclusion
The 2011 power-sharing agreement with two centre-left parties to guide Tunisia to
multi-party democracy and the recognition of the pluralism of Tunisian society
seemed the obvious destination of the Islamist party Ennahda, which has moved
away progressively from its anti-democratic and illiberal position to become a
much more traditional religiously oriented political party. Much of the literature
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on Islamist parties that has gone through a similar transformation explains this shift
over time with the moderation through inclusion thesis. This does not apply to the
Tunisian case because in a strict institutional sense the Islamist movement was
never genuinely afforded the possibility to participate in the political system and
cross-ideological cooperation never occurred before the mid to late 2000s. Its mod-
eration therefore needs to be accounted for differently and “moderation through
exclusion” can provide an answer. The reference here is not only to the state’s
repression of the movement through imprisonment and exile, although this
occurred on a large scale. The reference is more to a sort of societal rejection
whereby the speciﬁcities of Tunisian socio-political development meant that the
Islamist movement had to go through a profound re-elaboration of its initial politi-
cal categories in order not to be perceived as alien and irrelevant. In particular it had
to come to terms with an implicit social consensus shaped by Bourguibism and a
tradition of Islamic reformism.
The Tunisian Islamist movement developed from the early 1970s as a critical
reﬂection ofWestern modernity according to the model that Bourguiba, strictly fol-
lowing the secular tradition of France, imposed on the country.56 This widespread
and thorough critique of what was at the root of the Tunisian nationalist sentiment
and ideology became progressively less central and by the late 2000s there was an
almost complete turnaround of judgement on it, which is explicit in the documents
of the ninth congress of the party held in the summer of 2012. This does not imply
that Bourguibism is judged positively but there is recognition that the process of
construction of a moderate, nationalist, open, and Muslim Tunisia is possible
because its source is a tradition of religious reformism that comes from the experi-
ence of the Zitouna and that is speciﬁcally Tunisian. The fundamentalist vision of
Islam that the party had in the 1970s progressively disappeared because society
rejected it and this exclusion forced the party to re-elaborate the way in which it
wished to engage it. Over time the scale of rejection in society decreased and
the party made signiﬁcant inroads, but in order to do so it had to accept stances
and attitudes that comforted the nationalist self-image of Tunisians, a “country
that is both Muslim and open by virtue of its history and its geography”.57 The
necessity to engage for instance with the vast politicized sectors of a unionized
workforce that began to appear within the party in the late 1970s and early
1980s required the party to construct new categories of thinking and to abandon
simplistic sloganeering. The realization that Tunisia has a multi-layered identity
and expresses a high degree of social pluralism also affected the party and pro-
voked an internal debate as to how better take that factor into account.
The concept of exclusion carried also a narrower connotation: state violence.
There is no doubt that the experience of jail and exile had an impact on the
members and activists of the party and profoundly informed the views of
many of them who come into contact with leftist prisoners or with freer Euro-
pean societies. From a general point of view, exclusion as repression simply
slowed the process of introspection that the party went through in light of
societal exclusion. One of the principal characteristics of the Tunisian transition
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to democracy is that it links the political and ideological debate about the nature
of the state and state-society relations to what it was in the late 1980s and even
earlier to the struggle for independence. It is this inevitable mutual recognition
and its institutionalization on the part of Islamists and seculars of the plural mod-
erate Muslim nature of Tunisian society that will make or break Tunisian
democratization.
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